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The U.S. Constitution and
Anticipatory Self-Defense
Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
Ever since the U.N. Charter entered into force in 1945 a debate has ensued
about the meaning and scope of the right of self-defense under article 51 of the
Charter.' Two schools of thought have arisen. 2 One school claims that the term
"armed attack" must be taken literally and that members of the U.N. have fore-
sworn acts of self-defense even in the face of dire danger or severe provocation.
Only when the other side has actually engaged in hostilities by initiating an
"armed attack" can the first side resort to the use of force in self-defense. 3 The
second school maintains that the provision was not meant to establish new
limitations on the traditional right of self-defense, even in the absence of an
armed attack. It is noted that the term "self-defense" in article 51 is qualified by
the word "inherent," meaning that the natural right of a state to protect itself
against threats to its security was left unimpaired. The term "when an armed
attack occurs" is held to be merely illustrative." An anticipatory strike against
an enemy massing troops or making other signs of preparation for imminent
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'Article 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
2For succinct summaries of these two schools, see J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (ed. Sir
Humphrey Waldock) (6th ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 413-32; and K.
Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, Collective Security, Law of War and Neutrality, in Max
Sorenson (ed.), MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (London: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 765-68.
See also LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD -HAMBRO, AND ANNE P. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp.
344-48; and MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Washington: Gov't.
Printing Office, 1965), vol. 5, pp. 971-91.
'This interpretation is endorsed by such writers as Skubiszewski, op. cit.; HANS KELSEN, LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS (London: Stevens, 1950), pp. 269, 791; Quincy Wright, The Cuban
Quarantine, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. 57 (1963), pp. 546-63; and IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1963), pp. 264-80.
'Supporters of this interpretation include Waldock, op. Cit.; JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND
WORLD ORDER (London: Stevens, 1958), pp. 44, 92-104; and D. BoWErr, SELF DEFENCE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 24, 188-89.
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war would be barred by the first interpretation but permitted by the second.
A little-noticed provision of the U.S. Constitution would seem to have a direct
bearing on this debate, at least in so far as the United States is concerned.
Article 1, section 10, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides: "No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress ... engage in War, unless actually invaded, or
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." Irrespective of whether the
constitutional phrase "unless actually invaded" is equivalent to the Charter
condition "'if an armed attack occurs," clearly the right of a state to engage in
war when it is "in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay" goes beyond
the Charter condition; it implies action which is pre-emptive. A state, according
to this provision, is given the right to initiate war in advance of actual hostilities
and is not compelled to wait until after it has been attacked.
The question may be asked: does the word "danger" refer back to the term
"invaded" found earlier in the sentence, or does it stand alone-i.e., is a state's
right to engage in war limited to danger of "actual invasion" or does it cover any
danger of whatever sort? The Records of the Constitutional Convention Qffer no
guidance. The source for this constitutional clause is to be found in article VI of
the Articles of Confederation, which provided: "No State shall engage in any
war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such
State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a
resolution being formed by some nations of Indians to invade such States, and
the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in
Congress assembled can be consulted." In the Constitutional Convention, the
report of the Committee of Detail closely followed this terminology (except for
the reference to the Indians) and prohibited a state to engage in war "unless it
shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent
as not to admit of delay until the Legislature of the United States can be
consulted." 5 This formula was retained throughout, even through the report of
the Committee of Style on September 12.6 However, in the final discussions, two
days before the Convention adjourned, the provision was refashioned: the word
"invasion" in the latter part of the sentence was omitted as was the reference to
the legislature, and the provision now read: "or in such imminent danger as will
not admit of delay."7 Since there was no debate on the subject, it is not clear
whether the intention was merely to improve the style or actually to broaden the
freedom of action with reference to any danger-of invasion or otherwise. But in
either case, the provision clearly authorizes a state to take action while the
danger remains imminent.
The existence of the foregoing constitutional provision would seem to confirm
'MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (4 vols. Rev. ed. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), vol. 2, pp. 187, 442 n. 26.
'Ibid., p. 597.
'Ibid., p. 626.
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that for the United States, at least, the broader interpretation of article 51 of the
Charter, which leaves unimpaired the traditional right of recourse to force in the
face of imminent danger, is to be preferred. It might be argued, however, that
the federal government of the United States is bound by the Charter, including
article 51 in its narrow interpretation, regardless of any rights, including that of
self-defense, which the Constitution reserves for the individual states composing
the United States. This, however, would produce the rather anomalous state of
affairs, whereby the United States would not be permitted to launch
anticipatory strikes to ward off a threat of imminent danger, while one of the
state governments would be allowed to do so because such a right is preserved
for it under the Constitution. Thus, if Florida, for instance, was threatened by
action from Cuba, the United States Air-Force could not move, but the Florida
Coast-Guard or Air-Patrol would be free to act.
Against this it might be argued that the international commitment of the
United States would be equally binding on each of the state governments by
virtue of article VI of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, which provides
that ". . . all Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land. . . ." This argument, however, raises the very
interesting question whether the federal government is indeed empowered, by
means of a treaty, to affect any of the rights reserved by the Constitution to the
individual states. Justice Holmes, in his famous comment on the treaty power of
the United States, stated: "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so
when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question
whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts
prescribed to make the convention." 8 If this sweeping interpretation of the
federal treaty power is law, then the federal government's authority to bind the
states would be unaffected by any right which might be reserved to them by
virtue of the Constitution. But, as Professor Henkin has written: "Arguments,
based on the language of the Supremacy Clause, that treaties are not subject to
constitutional prohibitions are now well at rest."9 The matter was settled by the
1957 Supreme Court decision of Reid v. Covert in which Justice Black
declared: 10
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution,
as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our
entire constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting the
United States to exercise power under an international agreement without observing
constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction would permit amendment of
that document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V.
'Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
'Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1972), pp. 253-54; see also pp. 137-40.
10354 U.S. 1, at 17.
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The right of self-defense inhering in a state, is, of course, not a civil liberty
such as those guaranteed individual citizens under the Bill of Rights or the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, it is an essential assurance regarding the
state's very existence, and it is not to be presumed that, if such a right is
preserved under the Constitution, the federal government is empowered to
nullify it by treaty or otherwise. In the case of Geofrey v. Riggs, Justice Field
stated (albeit as dictum): I1 "It would not be contended that it [the treaty power]
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the
character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any
portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent." In accordance with
this pronouncement it is generally assumed that the treaty-makers could not
modify the republican form of government of the states, or even completely
abolish all state militia in the event, for instance, of a treaty prescribing general
and complete disarmament. 2
By the same token, if the terminology of article 1, section 10, clause 3, assures
every state in the union the right to engage in war in the face of "such imminent
danger as will not admit of delay," it is difficult to see how this right could be
abrogated by treaty. Consequently, if such right inheres in each of the state
governments, it must be presumed to inhere no less in the federal government.
This is particularly so since, according to article 4, section 4 of the Constitution,
the United States is committed to "protect each of them [the States] against
Invasion." Thus, the right of self-defense reserved to a state under article 1,
section 10, clause 3 must be covered by, and is indeed subsumed under, the
general protection to which the United States, by virtue of article 4, section 4, is
committed.
If this is the case, then of necessity it must be assumed that for the United
States, the broader interpretation of article 51 of the Charter is the correct one,
and the traditional concept of self-defense as it existed prior to the Charter,
including the right to exercise anticipatory force in certain circumstances,
continues to apply. 3
"133 U.S. 258 at 267 (1890).
"See the discussion in HENKIN, op. cit., pp. 147-48. Also see Louis HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL AND
INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 33-36.
"It might be noted, in passing, that if article 1, section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution sums up
the nature of self-defense for the United States, then the definition enunciated by Secretary of State
Webster in the case of the Caroline would seem to be too narrow. In his correspondence with British
Foreign Minister Ashburton in this case, Webster maintained that the right to exercise self-defense
by one state against the territory of another was limited to cases in which the "necessity of that self-
defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."
Cited in JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Washington, D.C.: Gov't.
Printing Office, 1906), vol. 2, p. 412; see also discussion in WILLIAM W. BISHOP JR.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2nd ed.: Boston, Little Brown, 1962), p. 777. It does
not appear that Webster took note of the foregoing constitutional provision under whose terms it
would be sufficient for a State to be confronted by "imminent danger as will not admit of delay"
alone, without anything more, for it to be free to exercise the right of self-defense.
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